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LITIGATING DIGNITY:
A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
Johanna Kalb*
I. INTRODUCTION
Prompted by the horrors of World War II, the General Assembly
of the United Nations proclaimed the hortatory Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR").1 Among other guarantees,
the UDHR speaks to the right to human dignity, promising that
"[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."2 In the years that
followed the issuance of the UDHR, the notion of a protected right
to personal dignity began to appear in the jurisprudence of state
and federal courts in the United States. The United States
Supreme Court has even adopted this term when discussing "the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment;
the Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful searches and
seizures; the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment rights to be free
from discrimination, and the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to make one's own decisions on procreation."3 Dignity also
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law. Thanks to
Martha Davis, Trey Drury, Davida Finger, Judith Resnik, Karen Sokol, and Reuben Teague
for the conversations that informed my thinking in this essay. This project would not have
been possible without the tireless research and editorial support of Geoff Sweeney.
1 See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS,
DRAFTING & INTENT 38 (University of Pennsylvania Press 1999).
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. AIRES/217(III),
at Art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948).
3 Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1935 (2003). See Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (referencing personal dignity and privacy in a Fourth
Amendment case); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994) (referring to
dignity in a Fourteenth Amendment case); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992) (applying dignity to rights relating to marriage and family); Dayton Bd. of Ed. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 532 n.6 (1979); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (applying human dignity to the Eighth Amendment); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). See also Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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appears in both the text of some state constitutions and, as I will
explore more thoroughly below, in other non-constitutional state
court jurisprudence.
In addition to its appearance in domestic litigation, the notion of a
right to dignity has assumed a prominent role in many
international human rights instruments enacted since the UDHR,
as well as in the laws of other nations. For example, the importance
of personal dignity appears frequently in the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD") and ties its signatories'
commitment "to promote respect for the inherent dignity of all
persons with disabilities" 4 with their obligation to promote, among
other things, access to education and healthcare.5  Dignity is
emphasized in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"), which draws an
explicit link between the UDHR's commitment to dignity6 and the
Convention's goal of ending discrimination against women.7 The
significance of human dignity is also emphasized in the constitutive
documents of many countries, including Germany,8 South Africa, 9
and Israel,10 and in several regional human rights instruments."
Interestingly, despite the parallel development of the dignity
concept in the domestic and international realms, only rarely have
they explicitly overlapped. That is, only on rare occasions have
United States courts-state, federal, or territorial-considered
international conceptions of "dignity," even those embodied in the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 67(b), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/106, at (j) (Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter CRPD].
Id. arts. 24, 25.
6 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res.
34/180, at Annex (Dec. 18, 1979) ("Noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
affirms the principle of the inadmissibility of discrimination and proclaims that all human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights . . . .").
7 Id. ("Recalling that discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of
rights and respect for human dignity .... ).
8 See GRUNDCESETZ [GG] [CONSTITUTION] art. 1 (F.R.G.) ("Human dignity shall be
inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.").
9 See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, Bill of Rights § 10 ("Everyone has inherent dignity and the
right to have their dignity respected and protected.").
10 See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, [CONSTITUTION] (Isr.).
11 See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (C
364) ("Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected."); American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Preamble, May 2, 1948, available at
http://www.oas.org/DIL/access-toinformationhumanrrightAmericanDeclaration of_the_R
ights-andDuties-of Man.pdf. The conventions and other instruments of the Inter-American
system are available at http://www.oas.org/dil/declaration and_resolutions.htm. American
Convention on Human Rights: 'Tact of San Jos6, Cosa Rica," arts. 5(2), 6(2), 11(1), Nov. 22,




human rights instruments signed and ratified by the United States,
when discussing the role that dignitary interests have to play in
resolving the claims before them. In recent years, scholars and
human rights advocates have sought to amplify this connection as
part of a broader attempt to situate the resolution of domestic legal
claims within an international human rights framework. Particular
attention has been paid to the potential for using human rights
principles to inform state constitutional interpretation, given the
frequent parallels between the rights guaranteed in international
instruments and the positive rights provisions in some state
constitutions. Thus, scholars have argued for consideration of
international standards when, for example, state courts are
interpreting constitutional guarantees for welfare or education. 12
The connection between international guarantees and domestic
rights is particularly pronounced in the context of dignity claims
because of their common source in the post-War discourse and in
the founding documents of the United Nations. As Professor Vicki
C. Jackson has explained, the dignity provisions in the constitutions
of Montana and Puerto Rico draw both directly and indirectly from
the text of UDHR for their foundational principles.13 Thus, she
contends that "students of transnational human rights discourse
would do well . .. to pay attention to the multiple fora for the
development, diffusion, and articulation of foundational concepts of
human dignity."14
Although Professor Jackson focuses on state constitutional
jurisprudence, her conclusion has broader implications. Even a
cursory review of state court decisions demonstrates that dignity as
a concept appears in many contexts in state jurisprudence, and that
the recognition of a right to human dignity is widely accepted, if not
well-defined and understood. This essay proposes a strategy for
"litigating dignity," not only in those states in which dignity is an
explicit constitutional principle, but more broadly, drawing on the
many cases in which dignity animates state court decisionmaking
on a wide variety of statutory, administrative, and common law
12 See Robert Doughten, Filling Everyone's Bowl: A Call to Affirm a Positive Right to
Minimum Welfare Guarantees and Shelter in State Constitutions to Satisfy International
Standards of Human Decency, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 421, 437-42 (2004); Martha F. Davis, The
Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and International Human Rights Law, 30 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 359, 372-74 (2006).
13 See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and
Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15 (2004).
14 Id. at 40.
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claims. These references in state court opinions offer opportunities
for advocates to situate their arguments within a broader human
rights framework by connecting the courts' recognition of dignity
and the concept's grounding within international human rights law.
They thus allow advocates to bring human rights principles to bear
on a wide variety of substantive legal claims that state courts have
determined to be intrinsic to basic human dignity-even in the
absence of a particular state constitutional provision-either as to
the dignity principle or as to the substantive right at issue. This is
not to suggest that courts themselves cannot simply look to
comparative and international experience without the mediating
influence of the recognized dignity concept. Rather, my contention
is that the courts' recognition of a personal dignity right provides a
channel for joining the ongoing parallel international and domestic
discourses.
This essay proceeds in two parts. Part II traces the origins of
dignity to highlight the historical connection that ties the
international conceptions of this term with its domestic
manifestations. It then documents the appearance of the dignity
concept in state court jurisprudence to demonstrate the breadth of
opportunity that litigating dignity presents. Part III considers how
advocates could use the dignity concept as a channel through which
to introduce a human rights-based framework into the
consideration of a broad variety of substantive legal claims.
II. THE ORIGINS OF DIGNITY
Although references to human dignity now permeate state and
federal case law, this was not always the case. Judith Resnik and
Julie Suk reviewed nine hundred opinions of the United States
Supreme Court in which the term "dignity" appears, and made the
following findings:
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the
Supreme Court mentioned the word 'dignity' only in terms of
entities such as sovereigns and courts. Moving forward to the
twentieth century, ... the word becomes linked to persons. It
was not until the 1940s-the decade of World War II and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights-that the Court
embraced dignity as something possessed by individuals.15
15 Resnik & Suk, supra note 3, at 1934.
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Resnik and Suk identify "[i]n such correlation. .-. causation."16 In
other words, they claim that "dignity talk in the law of the United
States is an example of how U.S. law is influenced by the norms of
nations, by transnational experiences, and by international legal
documents."17
Although their study focused on federal law, the appearance of
the notion of personal dignity follows a similar timeline in state
court jurisprudence. A Westlaw search for the terms "human
dignity" or "personal dignity" yielded 2721 cases.18 The frequency of
these citations appears to have increased dramatically in recent
decades, which may be attributable in part to the increased
availability of these decisions electronically. Over 2000 of these
citations have occurred in opinions rendered since 1992.19 By
contrast, only twenty-one of the decisions predate the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and only seventeen predate the onset
of World War 11.20
In the majority of the pre-war cases, the references are to the
personal dignity of the judge. 21 The term begins to be used in a
broader variety of contexts in the late 1930s, sometimes in cases
that explicitly make reference to world events. For example, in a
New York case annulling a marriage for fraud based on the
misrepresentation of the defendant-husband, a German citizen, that
he had been naturalized as an American, the court engaged in a
lengthy discussion of the events unfolding on the world stage in
which "[h]uman dignity itself has been debased." 22
Only a few years later, courts began to refer to an individual's
right to human dignity in his or her decisionmaking. In 1949,
another New York court determined that "detain[ing] a [psychiatric]
patient possibly for life to satisfy his wife's objections to his release,
would not seem in keeping with our belief in the right of the
individual to personal dignity and freedom."23  In 1950, the
Supreme Court of Georgia explained that "human dignity and
16 Id. at 1926.
17 Id.
1s The term "dignity" appears in 10,000 state cases on Westlaw, making a comprehensive
study exceedingly difficult.
19 The precise number of cases is 2035.
20 World War II commenced in 1939, while the Universal Declaration of Human Right was
adopted in 1948.
21 See, e.g., Haines v. Dist. Court of Polk Cnty., 202 N.W. 268, 270 (Iowa 1925) (discussing
the purpose of the contempt power).
22 Laage v. Laage, 26 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
23 People ex rel. Eskenazi v. Corcoran, 89 N.Y.S.2d 769, 772 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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individual freedom demand that one engaged in a lawful business
injurious to no one must not be arbitrarily prevented from the
legitimate prosecution of his business by [anti-competitive] city
ordinances,"24 and proceeded to void a city ordinance prohibiting the
sale of milk not pasteurized within the county.25
A sampling of the cases referencing personal or human dignity
suggests that they fall generally into three categories. First, and
most commonly, the term appears in constitutional interpretation.
The case law of the Montana and Puerto Rican courts is most often
discussed in this regard, as their constitutions explicitly protect a
dignitary interest. The dignity clause in these constitutions has
been invoked in cases relating to, inter alia, prison conditions, 26 the
right to die, 27 workplace discrimination, 28 and the recognition of
same-sex partnerships. 29
However, even in the vast majority of states that do not recognize
dignity as an explicit constitutional principle, the term has entered
the constitutional discourse. Sometimes state courts are presented
with a question of federal constitutional law in an area in which the
Supreme Court has previously acknowledged a dignitary interest.
In People v. Stevens, the California Supreme Court rejected a
federal due process challenge to the validity of a criminal trial
holding that, "[t]he presence of a deputy [standing near a criminal
defendant during trial] does not directly impair the accused's
mobility, nor does it create the affront to human dignity that we
have lamented in the context of visible shackles.30 In other cases,
the state courts have independently incorporated a concern for
individual dignity into the interpretation of their own constitutional
provisions. For example, California, Kansas, and West Virginia test
the constitutional validity of criminal punishment by considering
whether it is "so disproportionate to the crime for which it is
inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental
notions of human dignity."31
24 Moultrie Milk Shed, Inc. v. City of Cairo, 57 S.E.2d 199, 202 (Ga. 1950).
25 Id. at 203.
26 Wilson v. State, 2010 MT 278, 1 31 (Mont. 2010).
27 Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1214 (Mont. 2009).
28 Col6n v. Centro Grafico del Caribe, Inc., 98 T.S.P.R. 20 (P.R. 1998).
29 Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.2d 595, 611 (Mont. 2009) (Nelson J., concurring).
30 People v. Stevens, 218 P.3d 272, 282 (Cal. 2009).
31 State v. Gomez, 235 P.3d 1203, 1210 (Kan. 2010) (quoting State v. Freeman, 574 P.2d
950, 956 (Kan. 1978)) (considering whether a life sentence violates section 9 of the Kansas
constitution); In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 930 (Cal. 1972). See also State v. Booth, 685 S.E.2d
701, 708 (W. Va. 2009).
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The second way in which dignity arguments appear in state court
decisions is through the actions of state legislatures and
administrative agencies. In these instances, the courts are asked to
evaluate a challenged public or private action against a statutory or
administrative standard that explicitly lists the protection or
promotion of human dignity as one of its goals. In some cases, the
dignity concept appears to be quite pivotal to the holding. For
example, in Lewis v. Harris, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
relied on the language of the state Domestic Partnership Act,
emphasizing the relationship between access to the benefits of
marriage and the possession of "basic human dignity and
autonomy"32 in holding that there was no rational basis for denying
committed same-sex couples the full array of state benefits awarded
to married couples. 33
In other instances, the legislative emphasis on personal dignity
seems less central to the holding, but animates the more specific
statutory inquiry. In State v. Delaoz, the Vermont Supreme Court
considered the legislative purpose behind the state's indeterminate
sentencing law before striking down the defendant's sentence
(imposing a minimum term of four years and eleven months, and a
maximum term of five years) as a prohibited "fixed term."3 4 The
indeterminate sentencing law provides that the department of
corrections "shall have the purpose of developing and administering
a correctional program designed to . .. render treatment to
offenders with the goal of achieving their successful return and
participation as citizens of the state and community; to foster their
human dignity and to preserve the human resources of the
community."35 The court concluded that the sentence given in this
case was "so small as to effectively amount to a circumvention of the
indeterminate sentence law" and of its rehabilitative purpose. 36
The final set of dignity references in state law are difficult to
categorize. In these cases, the court raises the concept in support of
the correctness of its holding, but generally without explanation or
32 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 215 (N.J. 2006) (describing that for same-sex couples, "to
have access to these rights and benefits is paramount in view of their essential relationship to
any reasonable conception of basic human dignity and autonomy") (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §
26:8A-2(d) (West 2007)).
33 Id. at 217. The Court questioned "how withholding the remaining 'rights and benefits'
from committed same-sex couples is compatible with a 'reasonable conception of basic human
dignity and autonomy."' Id.
34 State v. Delaoz, 2010 VT 65, $T 40-42, 2010 WL 2795084 (Vt. 2010).
31 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 1(a) (2008).
36 Delaoz, 2010 VT 65, 44.
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citation. Thus, the function served by the notion of dignity in these
cases is somewhat unclear. A Texas court concludes its opinion
upholding the termination of a father's parental rights by noting
that "a child's right to basic human dignity and necessity is no less
a right under the law" than a parent's right to raise his own child.37
A California court takes a broad view of the rights guaranteed
under the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act because doing so
"allows the ADA to enhance self-autonomy and human dignity in
day to day living."38 Two dissenting justices in Mississippi critique
the court's decision to grant immunity to nursing home
administrators and licensees as providing "legal cover for those
responsible for ensuring the health, safety, and basic human dignity
of the aged and infirm."39 Although presented differently in each
instance, the concept of dignity appears to be invoked in order to
contextualize and emphasize the significance of the immediate issue
confronting the court. And the underlying assumption of these
references appears to be to a shared understanding or value-the
right to human dignity.
III. LITIGATING DIGNITY
The right to personal dignity is widely acknowledged in state
court decisions in a variety of substantive areas. Rarely, however,
is any content given to the term; nor is it clear how consideration of
the right to personal dignity influences the court's reasoning on a
particular issue. The peculiar combination of a well-recognized
concept lacking in explicit substantive content presents an
opportunity for advocates to contextualize certain legal issues
within a human rights framework by harnessing the international
and transnational sources of the personal dignity right.
Notable decisions linking the dignity concept with its
international roots demonstrate the effectiveness of using it to
frame a substantive issue before the court. In Sterling v. Cupp, the
Oregon Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the
practice of cross-gender patdowns of prisoners violated the state
constitution prohibition on treating prisoners with "unnecessary
rigor."40 Writing for the court, Justice Linde noted that there are
37 In re V.V., No. 01-08-00345-CV, 2010 WL 2991241, at *1 (Tex. App. ist July 29, 2010).
38 Nicholls v. Holiday Panay Marina, L.P., 93 Cal. Rptr.3d 309, 311 (Ct. App. 2d 2009).
39 Howard v. Estate of Harper ex rel. Harper, 947 So. 2d 854, 862 (Miss. 2006) (Diaz J.,
dissenting).
40 Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 130 (Or. 1981); see also OR. CONST. art. I, § 13.
1732 [Vol. 74.4
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"numerous and pervasive conditions intrinsic to the life of prisoners
to which persons who have not forfeited their liberty would not
willingly submit,"4 1 but framed the prisoners' objections as "to the
imposition of a needless indignity, to an invasion of [their] residuum
of personal dignity that is an imposition insofar as it goes beyond
recognized necessity."42 He went on to explain "that even convicted
prisoners retain claims to personal dignity"43 and noted the explicit
connection between humane punishment, bodily integrity, and
personal dignity that is found in many national prison standards, as
well as in a number of international law sources.44 He concluded
that due to their intimate nature, routine cross-gender patdowns
are unconstitutional unless justified by necessity. 4 5
Sterling demonstrates that even in the absence of an explicit
constitutional provision, the notion of personal dignity can act as a
significant restraint on governmental action. 46  Moreover, it
demonstrates how an international human rights framework can
contribute to conceptualizing what this barrier looks like. Justice
Linde relies on the international law sources to bolster his claim
that prisoners retain a right to personal dignity. He tracks the
personal dignity concept from the UDHR to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires "[a]ll persons
deprived of their liberty [to] be treated with humanity and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,"47 and
explains how this norm was then adopted into a number of
international and regional human rights instruments. 48  By
incorporating recognition of prisoners' protected rights to personal
dignity into the prohibition on unnecessary rigor, the court
extended the constitutional protection beyond "such historically
'rigorous' practices as shackles, the ball and chain, or to physically
41 Cupp, 625 P.2d at 130.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 130-32.
4 Id. at 136.
46 Of course, it has performed a similar role in the federal context, for example as a
restriction on governmental intrusions on privacy and on the kinds of punishments that the
government may impose. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (noting
that "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State"); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745
(2002) (characterizing certain inhumane and dangerous conditions by which a prisoner was
restrained as "antithetical to human dignity," and thus violative of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).




brutal treatment or conditions," to encompass a broader
understanding of injury.49
The concept of personal dignity may also work to create a positive
obligation. A California court's decision in Boehm v. Superior Court
provides another example of how the concept of dignity can act as a
bridge between the substantive question before a court and the
human rights framework.50  In Boehm, recipients of general
assistance welfare payments sought to prevent their county's
reduction of these payments. The court explained that the statutory
provisions governing the public assistance program required the
provision of "benefits necessary for basic survival." 51 The court then
determined that this level of "[m]inimum subsistence . . . must
include allocations for housing, food, utilities, clothing,
transportation, and medical care," citing in support of this decision
the methodology used by the state in determining costs of living for
poor families and precedent of the Supreme Court of California
describing these expenditures as essentials. 52 The court went on to
quote from the UDHR's provision guaranteeing every person the
right to an adequate standard of living, and then noted that:
it defies common sense and all notions of human dignity to
exclude from minimum subsistence allowances for clothing,
transportation and medical care. Such allowances are
essential and necessary to "encourage self-respect and self-
reliance ... in a humane manner consistent with modern
standards." Without a clothing allowance, recipients must
wear tattered clothing and worn out shoes. The lack of
adequate and decent clothing and essential transportation is
damaging both to recipients' self-respect and their ability to
obtain employment. Finally to leave recipients without
minimum medical assistance is inhumane and shocking to
the conscience. 53
The Boehm court relies on the concept of personal dignity to help
connect the guarantees of the UDHR to the statutory definition of
minimum subsistence. By framing the harm of deprivation as
partially a dignitary one, the court successfully links the state law
49 Id. at 129.
50 Boehm v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1986), superseded by statute, CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 17000.5 (West 2001), as recognized in Hunt v. Superior Court, 987 P.2d 705, 711
(Cal. 1999).
51 Boehm, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 72. (citation omitted).
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provision to a broader human rights framework, thereby promoting
a more robust understanding of what benefits are necessary for
basic survival.
These two examples are demonstrative of how advocates could
advance human rights-based dignitary claims in a variety of
substantive contexts. Of course, state courts could-as others have
suggested-simply draw upon relevant comparative and
international experience without injecting the mediating influence
of a dignity claim. My argument here is that the additional value of
"litigating dignity" is two-fold. First, the shared historical root of
the personal dignity concept in key international human rights
instruments offers further justification for referencing international
and comparative law sources when considering how the right to
personal dignity impacts United States courts' consideration of a
particular substantive right. By making this connection explicit,
advocates can help provide content for a well-recognized norm in a
way that may seem more legitimate, or at least more relevant.
Second, the introduction of dignity to the calculus will promote
discussion (and hopefully consideration) of the broader implications
of narrow issues confronting the courts. This in turn allows for
parallels to be drawn between the issue presented and the human
rights principles to which the United States has committed. In
other words, it helps advocates highlight the fundamental
importance of what may otherwise seem to be mundane questions of
common law development or statutory interpretation.
How would this work in practice? Advocates should first look to
see where and when a right to personal dignity is recognized in the
relevant state's statutory and common law. The New Jersey
Legislature has, for example, recognized the dignitary interests of,
inter alia, the elderly, persons with disabilities,54 patients in
psychiatric facilities,55 and the dying.5 6 Assume the parents of a
disabled adult wish to challenge the process by which their son's
placement in a state facility was determined as insufficiently open
to participation by the institutionalized person and his guardians.5 7
64 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 26:2Y-10 (West 2007) ("A client of an adult family care
home . .. has the right to: (1) be treated as an adult, with respect, dignity, courtesy and
consideration. . . .").
55 N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:4-27.11d (West 2008).
56 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 26:2H-54 (West 2007) ("This State recognizes the inherent
dignity and value of human life and within this context recognizes the fundamental right of
individuals to make health care decisions to have life-prolonging medical or surgical means or
procedures provided, withheld, or withdrawn.").
51 This case was heard by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1993. See J.E. ex rel. G.E. v.
2010/2011] 1735
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Under the approach outlined here, their lawyer5 8 would highlight
the significance placed on the protection of the dignity of disabled
individuals by the state legislature and the connection the
legislature has drawn between individual dignity and the disabled
person's right to placement in "the least restrictive conditions
necessary to achieve the purposes of treatment."59 The lawyer
would then note the historical roots of the concept of personal
dignity (now well-established in New Jersey law) in the language of
the UDHR and the development of this concept in the CRPD, which
lists as its purpose the "promot[ion] [of] respect for [the] inherent
dignity" of the disabled.60 The advocate could then point to the
CRPD's specific commitments towards realizing this objective-the
most relevant of which include ensuring that disabled persons are
not deprived of their liberty arbitrarily,61 that they are able to live
independently and participate fully in all aspects of life, and that
they receive the support they may require in exercising their legal
capacity62-to argue that full participation in these placement
decisions is core to a reasonable conception of human dignity. As in
Sterling6 3 and Boehm, 64 the tactical goal would be to frame the
dispute about a particular challenged practice within the broader
context of the disabled individual's claim to personal dignity under
international human rights law.
Of course both of these cases are now of somewhat older vintage.
As the adoption of the UDHR and several other major human rights
instruments has become more distant (and as the political climate
has become more hostile),65 judges and justices may be less aware of
(or less willing to consider) the relationship between domestic,
international, and comparative sources in defining basic human
rights. Nonetheless, this should not discourage advocates from the
Dept. of Human Services, 622 A.2d 227 (1993).
58 Or perhaps the author of an amicus brief, given space limitations.
59 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(e)( 2 ) (2011).
60 See CRPD, supra note 4, at 4.
61 Id. at 10.
62 Id. at 9.
63 See generally Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981) (using the concept of human
dignity in the prisoner treatment context).
64 See generally Boehm v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1986), superseded by statute,
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000.5 (West 2001), as recognized in Hunt v. Superior Court, 987
P.2d 705, 711 (Cal. 1999).
65 The most recent manifestation of this hostility has come in the form of legislative and
other efforts to ban the use of international or comparative law by state court judges and
justices. See Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Oklahoma State Question 755 and An




strategic use of these sources in their advocacy. Even if these
sources never appear in the court's decision, which based on current
trends seems likely,66 situating the substantive question within a
human rights framework may help define the relevant issues
presented to the court in a manner that ultimately has positive
effects. In other words, the dignity reference would act as a "norm
portal" for incorporating the human rights norms embodied in the
UDHR and other treaty instruments into domestic jurisprudence.
Professor Margaret McGuinness, who coined the term, uses it to:
describe any horizontal gateway that allows, through a
formal procedural mechanism or substantive right, the
importation of external norms in a legal system. A norm
portal represents an alternative pathway for international
human rights norms to enter a legal system. Where those
norms may not otherwise be enforceable through traditional
vertical adjudicatory processes, ... the norm portal permits
those norms to seep into the legal system, forcing mediation
between the external norm and the domestic standard.67
Thus, I contend that the advancement of these types of
arguments has inherent value, even if the reasoning is unlikely to
be replicated in the court's decision. By modifying the court's
analytical framework, it is forced to engage with external norms in
ways that may ultimately influence its decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
Much has been written about the sources and content of the right
to personal dignity.68 Nonetheless, as a practical matter, when it is
invoked in state jurisprudence, it often stands alone. Giving
66 See Johanna Kalb, Human Rights Treaties in State Courts: The International Prospects
of State Constitutionalism After Medellin, 115 PENN STATE L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (on file
with author).
67 Margaret McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of
Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 760 (2006).
68 See, e.g., Arthur Chasakalson, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, in THE
CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 133, 134 (David Kretzmer &
Eckert Klein, eds., 2002) ("In a broad and general sense, respect for dignity implies respect for
the autonomy of each person, and the right of everyone not to be devalued as a human being
or treated in a degrading or humiliating manner."); Matthias Mahlmann, The Basic Law at
60-Human Dignity and the Culture of Republicanism, 11 GERMAN L.J. 9, 13-17 (2010)
(discussing the development of the concept of human dignity in antiquity and its roots in
world religions); Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 202-04 (2008) (discussing how the value-based model of human
dignity in European constitutionalism does not translate to rights-based American
constitutionalism).
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content to "dignity" could increase the role it plays in informing a
court's decisionmaking and, given its roots in international human
rights law, advocates should refer courts back to this source for
suggestions as to its development. Although unlikely to effect an
immediate change in the language of judicial opinions, adopting this
framework may subtly begin to impact our collective understanding
of what is at stake.
